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There is a problem in business: a lack of awareness of social engineering, a type of non-technical hacking which is used to 
manipulate individuals into divulging confidential information or performing actions that compromise personal or 
organizational security. This problem affects employees by reducing their respective productivity. It also affects entire 
organizations because detecting and recovering from social engineering attacks is time-consuming and expensive. The 
purpose of this qualitative case study is to examine the potential lack of awareness of social engineering at organizations in 
southeast Michigan. The theoretical framework supporting this study is Buller and Burgoon's Interpersonal Deception Theory 
(IDT), which states in part that deception is an interactive process. The interaction between a social engineer and his/her 
target can be understood using IDT. Data will be gathered through face-to-face interviews with college faculty members in 
business and CIS/IT as well as businesspeople in southeast Michigan.  
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INTRODUCTION 
According to many researchers, humans are the weakest link in a security system (Gross & Rosson, 2007; Lacey, 2010; 
Mitnick and Simon, 2002; Peltier, 2006).  Human errors leave an organization vulnerable to several security threats, 
including social engineering attacks. Social engineering involves using influence, persuasion, and deception to convince an 
individual that the social engineer is someone (or something) s/he is not (Mitnick and Simon, 2002). It is used to manipulate 
individuals into divulging confidential information or performing actions that compromise personal or organizational security 
(Greitzer, Strozer, Cohen, & Moore, 2014, Peltier, 2006). 
Social engineers don’t need advanced technical skills, just the appearance of personal credibility and a willingness to 
manipulate helpful people. Reformed hacker Kevin Mitnick rarely had to physically "hack" into a computer system; instead, 
he would use social engineering techniques against an organization's employees, as this approach was often faster, safer, and 
more likely to succeed (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Twitchell, 2006). 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING TACTICS 
There are several approaches through which a social engineer can exploit an unsuspecting employee. If the employee is made 
to feel angry or afraid, for instance, then he or she will become more susceptible to manipulation. If the social engineer 
pretends to be a person in need of help, then the employee will likely try to assist, especially if that employee is in a service-
oriented position, e.g., a receptionist or customer service representative In addition, employees are conditioned to respond to 
authority, something that social engineers often use to their advantage. A tactic commonly used by a social engineer is posing 
as a representative of a company owner or executive when making unusual demands. Social engineers will often "bluff" 
suspicious employees by challenging the employee to verify the social engineer's claims, an approach which is often 
successful, as the employee does not want to appear foolish in front of an authority (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cox, 2012; 
Kamal, 2008; Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Peltier, 2006; Thornburgh, 2004). Sometimes, the social engineer will take a much 
simpler approach. Peltier (2006) notes that he was frequently able to access a locked building by waiting by the employee 
entrance while carrying several boxes of doughnuts; he simply waited for an employee to open the door, making sure to tell 
the employee where the donuts would be served. 
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SOCIAL ENGINEERING AWARENESS 
Though social engineering attacks pose a serious security risk, most organizations do not discuss social engineering during 
employee security training classes (Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Rotvold, 2008; Thornburgh, 2004). Rotvold (2008) conducted a 
survey to determine whether organizations are conducting regular training classes in order to educate their members about 
information security. In the study, 144 participants were asked questions regarding their job, their employing organization, 
and the types of information security training offered by their employing organization. The majority of survey participants 
(60%) indicated that their organizations conducted regular information security awareness training. Those participants 
indicated that their organization's training topics included security policies, acceptable use, password protection, workstation 
security, confidentiality, viruses, remote access, information sensitivity and classification, installation of unapproved 
software, and inappropriate licensing. Social engineering, however, was not a popular topic. In fact, Rotvold found that social 
engineering was one of the least-offered training topics.  
In addition, social engineering (and social engineering countermeasures) are largely absent from higher education 
information assurance curricula. Twitchell (2006) reviewed 11 commonly-followed information assurance curricula, e.g., the 
Certified Information Systems Security Professional Common Body of Knowledge (CISSP CBK), searching for the terms 
"social engineering" and "operational security" (some curricula include social engineering under that heading.) He also 
searched for social engineering countermeasures, training, and auditing. He found that only four of the curricula specifically 
mentioned social engineering, and only two mentioned social engineering policy countermeasures. In addition, none of the 
curricula mentioned social engineering education, training, awareness or auditing. If social engineering is largely absent from 
college curricula, then this phenomenon is contributing to the problem described above: the lack of awareness of social 
engineering in business. 
INTERPERSONAL DECEPTION THEORY (IDT) 
Trustfulness is a vital part of communication. Buller and Burgoon (1996) state that "[t]rust is the foundation on which 
enduring relationships are built, and trust grows with the belief that another is communicating in an honest, straightforward 
manner" (p.209). Contrary to this belief, deceit is commonplace; Buller and Burgoon (1996) suggest that fully a quarter of all 
conversations contain deception.  
The interaction between a social engineer and his/her target can be understood using Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT). 
Two main concepts of IDT are 1) interpersonal communication is interactive, and 2) it is mentally difficult to maintain or 
detect deception. Interpersonal communication is interactive because neither the sender (speaker) nor receiver (listener) are 
passive participants. Both give constant verbal and nonverbal cues, signaling emotions such as agreement, disagreement, 
trust, or suspicion, and those cues must interpreted (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Buller et al., 1996).  
Deception is difficult to maintain because it is a complicated process. When there is active communication between two 
people, verbal and nonverbal cues are constantly displayed, and those cues must constantly be interpreted. To be successful, a 
deceiver must appear to the listener to be sincere, which means the deceiver must constantly monitor and respond to the 
listener's reactions. The deceiver must be ready to instantly modify his or her approach if the message isn't being 
acknowledged, or if the listener becomes suspicious. The deceiver must be careful not to say too much or say the wrong 
things. The deceiver must also monitor their own nonverbal behaviors, such as body language, which might leak information 
to the listener, warning the listener that the deceiver is not being honest. For instance, a social engineer who is playing a 
helpless computer user needs to make sure that their words and body language match the part they are playing; displaying 
body language that suggests confidence or using technical terminology might make the listener suspicious. 
Deception detection is also complicated. The listener is typically focused on the message, not on the speaker. Trying to 
simultaneously analyze the message as well as the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of the speaker is extremely difficult. As a 
result, the listener typically will not look for deception unless there is an instance of verbal or nonverbal leakage which 
causes the listener to question the veracity of what the speaker is saying. For instance, if an employee is called by a social 
engineer who is posing as a member of the company's IT staff, the employee might become suspicious if the "IT person" 
doesn't know the name of the employee's boss, or becomes flustered when questioned. In addition, a listener who suspects 
deceit must decide whether to show or hide their suspicion – all while continuing to focus on the message. An experienced 
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CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study is to examine the lack of awareness of social engineering that affects employees at organizations in 
southeast Michigan. Social engineering is used to manipulate individuals into divulging confidential information or 
performing actions that compromise personal or organizational security. Despite the significant threat that is posed by social 
engineering attacks, social engineering is largely absent from higher education information assurance curricula, and most 
organizations do not discuss social engineering during employee security training classes. This research will investigate the 
presence of information security in general, and social engineering in particular, in business curricula. The study will also 
investigate the presence of the topic of social engineering in a company’s security awareness training and organizational 
security policies.  
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